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Abstract
Background: Community initiatives for renewable energy are emerging across Europe but with varying numbers,
success rates and strategies. A literature overview identifies structural, strategic and biophysical conditions for
community success. Our analysis focuses on institutional structure, as we describe the variety between the
Netherlands, Germany and Denmark, and place this within the institutional context of the policies, power structures
and energy discourses of each country.
Methods: We conducted a policy arrangements analysis with a series of semi-structured interviews, extensive
content analysis of policy documents, media analysis and use of existing research, in a qualitative comparative
analysis between the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark.
Results: We demonstrate that the (evolving) institutional configuration of the energy sector strongly influences the
available space for community initiative development. Denmark has a traditionally civil society-friendly energy sector,
although opportunities for communities have decreased following the scaling up of production facilities. The Netherlands
knows a predominantly market-oriented institutional arrangement that leaves little space for communities, but the
potential for community based energy is increasingly recognized. In Germany, the typically state-dominant Energiewende
strategy creates a window of opportunity for community initiatives that fit within the state policy.
Conclusions: We conclude that the institutional arrangement of the energy policy subsystem can both constrain or
enable community energy projects. Decentralization appears to be one of the most important characteristics of the
general institutional development and generally increases the institutional space for local (community) players. The
alignment of discourses across government levels and actors is one of the important enabling features of an energy
system, as it provides the stability and predictability of the system that enables communities to engage in renewable
energy projects.
Keywords: Community initiatives; Renewable energy; Institutional arrangements; Institutional space; Policy analysis
Background
The transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy pre-
sents one of the biggest current challenges for European
governments. All across Europe, governments are seeking
to meet the goals of the EU climate and energy package
[1] to which they have committed themselves, while their
economies and industries are still largely dependent on
fossil fuels. Both states and markets are constrained by the
infrastructural and economic path dependency of large
fossil energy systems. No wonder then that citizens, orga-
nized in communities, have taken initiative by themselves
to innovate their energy provision in a more sustainable
way. Community initiatives for renewable energy are on
the rise. There are thousands of cooperatives and other
local, non-profit initiatives active across Europe, aiming to
promote the production and consumption of renewable
energy (RE) and reduce energy consumption [2]. These
civil society activities for renewable energy and for sus-
tainability in general have received an increasing
amount of political and media attention [3,4]. Community-
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based implementation of (alternative) RE technologies has
widely been advocated as ‘a way of implementing renewable
energy technologies, emphasizing themes of self-sufficiency,
local determination, engagement and empowerment’ [5].
Although there is a large variety among community-
based RE initiatives, what they have in common is that
they are typically locally based, non-commercial, small-
sized and that they rely to a large extent on the engage-
ment and actions of highly motivated people with limited
power and limited resources [6]. It is probably because of
these characteristics that studies of communitarian RE ini-
tiatives have a tendency to overstress the importance of
agency characteristics such as leadership, while neglecting
the importance of contextual and structural factors. Yet,
the rules and procedures for project planning and imple-
mentation, available subsidies and the attitude of market
and government partners may also be critical success fac-
tors for community projects.
This paper studies the influence of these contextual
and structural factors. Starting from the observation that
community initiatives vary in occurrence and variety
across countries, we ask in what ways the institutional
configuration of the energy sector facilitates or con-
strains community initiatives for renewable energy. Since
we are interested in the prospects of community RE ini-
tiatives, it is important to understand how and to what
extent in current policy arrangements, the state, market
and associations are complementary to community RE
initiatives and to what extent they compete with, adopt
or take over those initiatives. By identifying the prospects
of community initiatives and their institutional opportun-
ities and constraints, it becomes clear under which institu-
tional conditions communities can be a partner for
governments in their search to make the shift from fossil
fuels to renewable energy.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we provide a
literature review on theoretical explanations for commu-
nity initiatives' presence and success, divided into agency-
oriented, structure-oriented and biophysical perspectives.
We elaborate on the structure oriented approach by intro-
ducing institutional arrangements theory, in order to clas-
sify the different institutional configurations in which
initiatives are situated. Next, the ‘Results and discussion’
section contains an account for the methodology, includ-
ing the case selection and data collection. The section
‘Conclusions’ presents data from the case study countries
Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. We end this
paper with conclusions and a reflection on the prospects
for community-based RE initiatives.
Community initiatives for renewable energy
Community initiatives for renewable energy can be defined
as decentralized, non-governmental initiatives of local
communities and citizens to promote the production and
consumption of renewable energy. They form a hetero-
geneous group of projects focused at the provision or
production of RE, the reduction of energy consumption
and the support for private households to produce their
own RE or reduce private consumption. Following
Walker and Devine-Wright [7], RE projects can be cate-
gorized as community projects by distinguishing the tar-
get group of the project (who the project is for) and the
actively involved participants (who the project is by).
Projects are characterized as community initiatives
when the local community participates actively in the
planning, decision-making and/or exploitation of the
project and benefits from its revenues or other accom-
plishments [8]. Community initiatives for renewable en-
ergy are only those initiatives that are involved in the
production or provision of renewable energy or aim to
achieve this in the near future. This excludes a large var-
iety of broader sustainability initiatives.
Theoretical explanations about the occurrence and
opportunities for community initiatives take either an
agency-oriented focus or a structure-oriented focus,
and most acknowledge the importance of (bio)physical
characteristics. Agency-oriented explanations tend to
look at the incidental characteristics of individual projects.
Community initiatives depend largely on unique individ-
ual features such as detailed local knowledge, intrinsic
motivation, and leadership capabilities. While these indi-
vidual factors may explain variation between projects, they
cannot explain why different countries display different
patterns of appearance and success of community initia-
tives. Structure-oriented explanations, on the other hand,
focus on the institutional contexts in which community
projects are embedded. This ranges from local institution-
alized structures to the meso- and macro-level of whole
policy subsystems and country characteristics such as the
formal legislation and the degree of centralization. Each of
these approaches tend to identify different success and fail
factors for community RE initiatives, which will be out-
lined below. Biophysical characteristics form the precondi-
tions for projects, as they set the boundaries for what is
physically possible and feasible.
Agency approaches
Community projects are typically small and are to a large
extent dependent on the individual motivations and cap-
acities of their members. A literature review points out
a number of individual characteristics, sometimes sup-
plemented by (local) structural features. Middlemiss and
Parrish [6] distinguish between cultural, organizational, in-
frastructural and personal capacities of grassroots initia-
tives and other agency-oriented explanations fit well into
this taxonomy. Cultural capacity includes the legitimacy
and socially defined meaning of sustainability objectives,
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as well as their embedment in community values. A pro-
environmental attitude and the intrinsic motivation to act
according to environmental/sustainability beliefs has been
a precondition for a success in the past [9]. Citizens can
be intrinsically motivated to improve their (direct) envir-
onment, which means that economically unviable projects
might still be carried out, but economic interests are be-
coming increasingly important motivations as well (per-
sonal communications EnergiByen Frederikshavn, 2013).
The individual motivations for RE engagement can be
diverse and can supplement each other pragmatically.
Hence, social movements for local RE may be based on ar-
guments of autarky, anti-capitalism and energy security,
as well as anti-nuclear sentiments [10,11]. These motiva-
tions can supplement environmental motivations, and the
increased economic viability of projects due to techno-
logical developments and subsidy schemes adds an eco-
nomic motivation. The monopoly of fossil fuels, technology
and financial means rested with large companies and
foreign countries, and local RE provides energy security,
control over production and supplies and the reduction
of the risk of shortage and accidents [12].
Organizational capacity refers to the position of com-
munity RE initiatives within the wider local community.
Community initiatives for RE are advocated because
they emphasize self-sufficiency, local determination,
engagement, social cohesion and empowerment of local
communities [5]. Social support of the wider commu-
nity for community projects (either environmental or
economic) positively influences their success [9], as
does social cohesion in general. When successful, com-
munity involvement creates a sense of ownership and
responsibility that reduces not in my back-yard (NIMBY)-
effects and increases local acceptance of wind parks or
other RE installations [13]. A community also needs social
capital and social cohesion to be able to organize commu-
nity projects [14], as well as political will [15].
Infrastructural capacity pertains to grid access and
the provision of facilities for sustainability by the gov-
ernment or market parties. However, this is still dis-
cussed at the local level. Local communities can act as a
fertile testing ground for new technologies, which stim-
ulates innovation and provides highly visible examples
of ‘technology at work’ [15]. Lastly, personal capacity
refers to the resources of the individual members of an
initiative. Community projects typically rely on the vol-
untary contributions, intrinsic motivations, and collect-
ive action capacities of their members. This includes
their skills, knowledge, leadership qualities, values and
enthusiasm [6]. Knowledge and (access to) technology
and expertise are also seen as critical conditions for
small projects [15], as is the availability of budget (ibid.).
These different capacities act as indicators for the strength
of a community initiative.
Structure approaches
The literature on community RE identifies a number of
macro- and meso-level institutional conditions that can
enable or constrain community initiatives and thus de-
termine their institutional space. Schut et al. [16] state
that ‘space for innovation is embedded in and consti-
tuted by dynamics between socio-cultural, biophysical,
economic, political and legal subsystems’. Socio-cultural
attributes include the public perception of energy and of
the role of communities in this and the attitude towards
experimenting and innovation. Economic conditions in-
clude not only the division and allocation of financial
and other material resources among the actors in the en-
ergy sector but also the general economic (investment)
climate. This depends partly on the expected profitability
of the project. Without access to financial resources
from other partners, community initiatives will be limited
in their options. Next, legal conditions include not only
the formal legislation that directly and indirectly regards
RE, including Electricity Acts and grid access, but also the
degree of territorial and functional decentralization, the
structure of the polity and the procedures for collective
decision-making. Political factors are not only related to
the legal framework but also include the ‘softer’ character-
istics of the political system such as subsidy and schemes
and the political will to enable RE projects.
(Bio)physical conditions
Lastly, physical conditions form boundaries on the phys-
ical possibilities of projects. They include not only, e.g. the
availability of renewable resources such as sunlight hours
and wind potential (biophysical) but also the options for
harvesting resources, such as availability of technologies.
Moreover, the spatial planning of the project area is an im-
portant physical condition. Urbanized regions will be less
suitable for large-scale plans, as physical space is limited,
contested over, and expensive. Likewise, the remoteness of
rural regions might present problems for (grid) infrastruc-
ture. Beyond practical problems, the spatial layout and de-
gree of urbanization also influence local structural and
agency characteristics. Governance structures, e.g. tend to
be more complex in cities, where the multiplicity of actors
and interests increases, as well as the variety of scales of
governance and political spaces [17]. For successful pro-
ject implementation, plans should be aligned with the bio-
physical and built environment of the project, which poses
specific demands on the spatial planning and planning
processes. Furthermore, the degree of urbanization in-
fluences the preferences for RE developments and the
readiness to take local action [18].
Table 1 summarizes the factors and characteristics that
are assumed to be important for the success or failure of
community RE initiatives.
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Institutional arrangements theory
It goes without saying that both individual - agency-based -
factors and structural factors are important in explaining
the success or failure of local community RE initiatives,
within the boundaries set by (bio)physical conditions. By
introducing institutional arrangements theory, we re-
search the relative importance of structural characteristics
of the energy sector.
Hall and Taylor [19] define an institutional arrange-
ment as ‘the formal or informal procedures, routines,
norms and conventions embedded in the organizational
structure of the polity or political economy’. Following
Sabatier and Jenkins [20] and Howlett and Ramesh [21],
the set of policy institutions can be considered a policy
subsystem, as a ‘space’ where relevant actors discuss pol-
icy issues and persuade and bargain in pursuit of their
interests. It includes actors who are intimately involved
in the issues at stake, as well as those who are only mar-
ginally involved. Policy subsystems incorporate both
interest networks and discourse communities. Subsys-
tems may be constituted by an almost infinite variety of
actors and institutions, and their composition may vary
by country, by policy sectors or domains and over time.
Even within one country, many of the mentioned factors
are shaped at multiple levels of governance, providing a
specific institutional local landscape for each community
project within the energy sector. In this paper, we distin-
guish between four such ideal typical ordering principles
that can be identified by their central institution and their
guiding principles [22] and finds its roots in the classical
divide between market, state and society. A market-ori-
ented system is guided by the principle of dispersed com-
petition and has for-profit market players as its most
influential actors. A state or bureaucratic system is guided
by hierarchical control with the government as dominant
actor. A civil society or community-oriented system will be
based on spontaneous solidarity. Fourth, a corporatist as-
sociational order will be governed through an institution-
alized and organized associational structure [23].
Governance of the energy sector can be considered a
mixture of these four institutional logics that form a set of
interrelated incentives and constraints, which are likely to
influence agent's behaviour and strategies. The prospects
of community RE initiatives are dependent on the way
these four different logics relate to each other in the en-
ergy sector and to what extent the state, market and asso-
ciations are complementary to community RE initiatives
and offer them institutional space. Institutional space is
here defined as the degree of discretionary freedom of
community initiatives to decide autonomously about the
design of a project (in terms of procedures and planning)
and its contents (in terms of its goals and means). This in-
cludes not only the absence of constraints but also the
presence of enabling conditions. In the case of community
renewables, this means that the interplay of state, market
parties, possible associations and communities themselves -
and their guiding principles - offers a certain room for
communities to create their own renewable energy
provision. This hypothetically influences the success
that these projects will have as well as their spread and
heterogeneity.
A community-oriented ideal type
It seems obvious that the institutional space for communi-
ties would be the largest in a community-oriented ideal-
typical model of governance. However, since the capacities
and ambitions of community projects usually remain at a
local scale, the arrangement as a whole and the network
of community and other stakeholders have to provide an
enabling environment for small-scale initiatives to de-
velop. Even when an arrangement is community-oriented,
communities are always embedded in a subsystem with
economic and political players. In Western-European lib-
eral democratic countries, there always is a fundamental
imbalance of power between civil communities, the (local)
government - who hold formal decision-making power
and political legitimacy as well as some of the resources
(e.g. the electricity grid) - and the markets that hold part
of the resources, technologies, expertise and financial re-
sources. Therefore, communities, government, market
parties or associations will somehow cooperate to enable
societal initiatives to develop. Given these conditions,
Table 1 Characteristics that influence occurrence and success of community RE initiatives
Type Dimension Characteristics
Strategic Cultural Legitimacy of sustainability objectives, pro-environmental attitude, willingness to act
Organizational Support for community action
Personal Leadership, knowledge and expertise, access to technology and grid, adaptive capacity, management skills
Institutional Political Subsidies, flexibility, priority for sustainability goals, project support (advice, financial), network
Legal Formal rules and regulations, decision-making procedures, degree of discretionary space, control mechanisms
Economic Division of material resources, availability of investors, expected profitability
Socio-cultural Capacity for institutional learning, problem perception, attitude on experimentation
(Bio-)physical Wind speed, solar hours, tidal waves, hydropower; presence of fossil fuels, urbanization, technological developments
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however, the community-oriented ideal-type model of
governance is indeed most promising. It leaves room for
decentralized policy and local variation tailored to specific
circumstances, preferences or dominant ideas within the
community. Nonetheless, the question remains if commu-
nities themselves have the capacities to develop in such an
‘open’ environment, in which there is much less steering
than, e.g. the government-oriented arrangement. In the
latter, communities might have less space but more direc-
tion, which might lead to success as well.
A state-oriented ideal type
A system dominated by state hierarchy can both enable
and constrain communities. State steering increases the
chances of success for certain types of community initia-
tives, namely, those that are institutionally supported
through, e.g. funding, tenders or permission grants. At
the same time, hierarchical control can limit the space
of other community initiatives, which implies that there
will be a low variety of initiatives. Only those that are in-
stitutionally supported are likely to succeed, and other
initiatives will have no space to develop. This decreases
the chances for, e.g. new technologies or experimental
designs, because they are unlikely to fit into the institu-
tional structure of rules and finance of the state. Another
hypothesized limitation to this type of basic institution or
model of governance is that the space provided to com-
munities by the state has to overlap with the needs and
possibilities that appeal to the communities. Subsidy
schemes can for example stimulate a certain activity,
such as purchasing solar panels, but for a community
that strongly values the authentic looks of its buildings
for tourism, this hypothetical institutional space cannot
be used.
A market-oriented ideal type
A market-oriented system has an economic incentive
that is tailored towards preferably larger market parties
(economics of scale) and therefore leaves little room for
projects that are non-profit or small-scale. Moreover,
this ordering principle generally lacks uniformity in rules
and policies at the decentralized level because the national
government will turn mostly to national schemes for large
investors to create renewable energy. This means that sub-
sidies, knowledge and detailed policy are most likely to be
found at the national level and not locally. Community
initiatives therefore face a larger challenge to acquire the
necessary resources and knowledge about relevant rules,
rights and options, which poses a major constraint. Also,
in a market-oriented system, the weight attributed to
profit is larger, and because profits of community projects
can be expected to be low, this decreases the chances of
success. This is both because the projects would be less
interesting to investors, which would weaken the network
of a community initiative, and because the market-oriented
discourse might leave less room for non-profit consider-
ations in the communities in general.
A fourth order? The associational ideal type
Lastly, the corporatist associational order is clearly vis-
ible in, for example, the field of agriculture (corporative
structures forming a green front) or in housing policies
with housing associations. This order is not straightfor-
wardly recognized in the subsystem of renewable energy.
This would actually be a new hybrid institution in which
societal roots of shared responsibility and environmental
concerns are combined with market tasks such as energy
profitability, security and access and governmental re-
sponsibilities (both environmental and economic). In the
energy sector, this would provide for a (hybrid) setting
in which institutions are originally stemming from com-
munity initiatives but are highly institutionalized into
formal decision-making, for example, through semi-
governmental associations that take over parts of the en-
ergy market. Even though at present, the associational
order does not appear dominant, elements of this ideal-
type might be visible and/or emerging in the energy sec-
tor. The call for devolution of functions to local groups
and associations and a new role of the state as defining
the basic goals of public policy and selecting the social
actors that participate in the formation and implementa-
tion of public policy or services [24] are clearly present
in the normative arguments for facilitating and formaliz-
ing community initiatives and participation. The associ-
ational order does not only have to resemble a full
corporatist system but could also indicate a more gen-
eral turn towards a system in which state and civil soci-
ety become part of a single, regulatory framework that
reveals new modes of cooperation (ibid.). This could, e.g.
include public private partnerships, civic participation in
local planning or a large degree of organization of the
community movement.
Methods
Our theoretical assumptions started from the ideal types
of ordering principles [22] that we have rephrased
models of governance. To describe the empirical ‘on the
ground’ configurations, we used the policy arrangements
approach (PAA) [25,26]. This approach offers a compre-
hensive method to describe policy subsystems, as will be
elaborated upon in the following paragraphs.
Case selection
Empirically, we conducted a comparative analysis of com-
munity initiative movements in the Netherlands, Germany
and Denmark. Denmark was chosen because of its well-
known reputation for creating an enabling environment
for community initiatives and collective action, which
Oteman et al. Energy, Sustainability and Society 2014, 4:11 Page 5 of 17
http://www.energsustainsoc.com/content/4/1/11
resembles the community-oriented ideal type [27]. The
Netherlands was chosen because of its traditionally
strong ties with the (predominantly fossil fuel oriented)
energy industry and its market-oriented approach; while
Germany, finally, is known for the dominant intervening
role of the state in the energy system and its system of
public RE provision. This approaches the state-oriented
ideal type. Using this variety on the independent variable,
we hope to explain the position of community initiatives
in each country through their institutional arrangement
and which ideal type this relates to.
The policy arrangements approach
The PAA starts from the assumption that policies and
polity, such as the ones guiding the energy sector, can be
described as a policy subsystem in which specific pat-
terns of behaviours of actors, power relations and divi-
sions of resources as well as rules of the game and
discourses are - throughout the years - institutionalized
into a specific arrangement. Such an arrangement not
only shows a certain degree of institutional stability but
is also open to changes from outside (because of societal
modernization, changing technology, changing modes of
governance on higher levels of the political system, the
role of Europe, etc.) or internal imbalances (e.g. actor
conflicts, diverging discourses vis-à-vis actor - coalitions,
outdated rules of the game or changing power relations).
A PAA has been defined as the ‘temporary stabilization
of the content and organization of a policy field’ [28].
PAA distinguishes between four dimensions of a policy
subsystem: actors and coalitions, power and resources,
rules of the game and policy discourses. By including
discourse (ideas) as a relevant dimension of a policy
framework, PAA can be placed within the discursive-
institutionalist tradition. Through mapping the actors,
their constellations and coalitions and relative power po-
sitions, one can see the interaction of the main ‘players
of the game’. The rules of the game, both formal and in-
formal, also include the procedures that have to be
followed and the political culture. Resources include not
only financial resources but also power relations and
political influence. Lastly, discourse includes the framing
of policies, RE and energy problems and dominant para-
digms. Using the PAA will lead to an overview of the insti-
tutional arrangement, the place of community initiatives
and the cultural and organizational capacity of the
Middlemiss and Parrish typology. The relevant charac-
teristics that were identified in Table 1 will also fall into
place. Political and legal institutional characteristics are
part of the power division between the actors, the rules
of the game which they establish and the allocation and
division of resources. Similarly, resource division is present
in the economic dimension. The socio-cultural character-
istics of the subsystem reflect its discourse on RE. These
factors are intertwined and mutually influencing as is
demonstrated in the case description.
Data collection
To construct the descriptions of the current presence of
community initiatives and the policy arrangements of
the energy sector, a large variety of data was used. This
includes a content analysis of all relevant national legis-
lation since the liberalization of the energy market in the
three countries, such as Electricity Acts, Energy Agree-
ments, and the Danish Renewable Energy Act [29]. The
content analysis also included a variety of provincial/state
level legislation, subsidy and grant schemes, tenders and
procedures for planning and permits.
As a second strategy, we conducted over 20 semi-
structured interviews in Denmark and in the Netherlands
and a small number in Germany, with (umbrella) organi-
zations, academic experts, energy companies, research
and development (R&D) institutes and politicians. This
gave insight in the energy policy subsystem and the pos-
ition and activities of community initiatives.
We supplemented this with data from a media review
using the archives of large national newspapers. This was
not a full-fledged media analysis but a secondary source of
data to supplement the content analysis [30]. This search
added information on community initiatives and RE policy
debates. Additionally, there is also a large availability of
data that we used from umbrella organizations [31,32],
previous academic research, civil society movements and
governmental organizations. This includes databases of
projects [33] and case studies on renewable energy policy
and community projects. We conducted site visits of com-
mercial, community-based and local government-owned
projects in the three countries to gain insight into their
daily affairs. We conducted participatory observation at
meetings of umbrella organizations and sustainability
networks, expert conferences and information meetings
about RE.
The study has included a large variety of data, of which
the content analysis of policy documents, the interviews
and the used databases account for the majority of the
findings. This triangulation enhances the validity of the
findings, mostly for the Netherlands and Denmark, since
for Germany, fewer interviews could be conducted. To
supplement this data for Germany, we refer to case studies
on wind power and renewable energy policy in Germany
[34-40] and documentation on the Energiewende by non-
governmental organization (NGO)'s and researchers [41,42].
The partial reliance on data that was provided by other re-
searchers and institutes reduces the reliability of the analysis,
which is a constraint on the strength of the conclusions.
However, the variety of used data is large, and the findings
for each case are consistent across data sources.
Oteman et al. Energy, Sustainability and Society 2014, 4:11 Page 6 of 17
http://www.energsustainsoc.com/content/4/1/11
Results and discussion
Community initiatives for renewable energy are not a new
phenomenon: in the Netherlands, wind cooperatives have
been active since the 1980s [43]; in Germany, these even
date back a century [44]; and Denmark has a rich history
of both community-based district heating systems and
wind cooperatives following the 1970s oil crisis [27] (per-
sonal communications Danish Energy Agency, 2013). This
section describes community initiatives in each country
and a sketch of the historical context and present config-
uration of the energy sector.
Community initiatives in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, we can distinguish two different types
of initiatives. The first type is the classical wind coopera-
tive, in which members collectively own and exploit one
or more wind turbines. Twenty-five wind cooperatives
were founded in the late 1980s and early 1990s, emerging
from the anti-nuclear and pro-environmental movements
[43]. These cooperatives still exist (although a few merged),
and a small number of new cooperatives were established
in the past two decades. Although some are involved in
other activities besides exploiting the turbine(s), such as
providing information about other renewable energy or
sustainability practices (e.g. home insolation), they are fo-
cused, well-established organizations. Since net metering
is prohibited, it is financially unprofitable for cooperatives
to collectively exploit facilities for self-delivery to members.
Collectively owned facilities usually sell their electricity on
the market to large RE suppliers such as GreenChoice and
Eneco (personal communications WDE, 2013; personal
communications Eneco, 2011). Out of the 31 currently ac-
tive wind cooperatives, only two sell directly to their mem-
bers (Zeeuwind and De Windvogel). The wind cooperatives
are found in rural areas and have a regional identity.
The second type of initiatives is of more recent date:
the past few years have known a drastic rise in the number
of ‘new style’ community initiatives for decentralized re-
newable energy, often referred to as local renewable en-
ergy companies (LDEB). Apart from the traditional wind
cooperatives, there are over 200 local initiatives involved
in RE, including over 55 registered cooperatives and 15
more cooperatives that are in the process of legal registra-
tion [32] (personal communications Van Bekkum, 2013).
Furthermore, there are well over 100 associations, founda-
tions, informal working groups and project teams working
on local RE. These initiatives aim to promote energy sav-
ings, promote private RE production, facilitate cooperative
RE production, and/or supply RE to their members. The
initiatives have a different spatial distribution: where wind
cooperatives are found in rural areas, mostly near the
shores; LDEBs are found in cities and rural areas alike.
They often have a city or municipal identity, which is
reflected in their names.
Most LDEBs were founded recently and are therefore
still in their planning phase. Their activities firstly focus
on the internal organization and the development of a
sound business plan. Production of RE is not imple-
mented yet for most LDEBs, but there is a wide range
of plans, ranging from putting solar panels on public
roofs (e.g. AZEC in Doetinchem) to manure fermenting
(e.g. Haarlose Marke). Most projects are starting with the
‘low hanging fruits’: relatively cheap activities such as in-
formation spreading and collective purchase of low energy
lighting, solar panels or home insulation measures. An-
other activity that is typical for the Dutch situation is the
purchase of ‘green electricity’ through collective contracts
with large energy providers such as GreenChoice. Al-
though this is a way of providing green electricity to
members, the only decentralized aspect of it is the local
collective discount with large, centralized and for-profit
energy companies.
The main motivation for LDEB's is both environmental
and economic: to provide a better (local) environment and
a sustainable future and create local economic benefits
through energy savings and revenue from joint projects.
The initiatives sometimes receive a financial contribution
from the municipality, but this is not standard. They rely
on local fundraising for their starting capital, which ex-
plains the trend to start with small activities.
Overall, the Dutch community initiatives are relatively
new, with the exception of the traditional wind coopera-
tives. The recent large growth of initiatives has resulted
in a heterogeneous group of early-phase projects that
are still exploring their options for local RE production
and provisions.
The Dutch institutional arrangement
The dominant governmental actor in the Dutch energy
sector is the national Ministry of Economic Affairs, work-
ing together with the provinces, the facilitating state-based
agency Agentschap NL, the Environmental Assessment
Agency (PBL) and the Social and Economic Council
(Sociaal Economische Raad, SER) [45]. The prominence of
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the SER creates a
strongly economical approach to renewable energy plan-
ning (ibid.). The government subsidizes RE through the
Stimuleringsregeling Duurzame Energie (SDE+) subsidy
for purchase of private solar panels and by compensating
wind turbine exploiters for net losses (e.g. 150 million
euros in 2011) [46]. The national government set a goal of
14% RE by 2020 (which is very modest compared to EU
targets and other EU countries). To reach this goal, it
looks primarily at large business partners rather than at
communities (personal communications PBL, 2013; SER
working conference Energy Agreement, 2013). Although
the policy making is centralized, provinces and municipal-
ities have the freedom to implement their own strategies
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and plans. They display a wide variety of approaches to
RE, from prohibiting projects (e.g. the building stop for
turbines in Noord-Holland province) to actively founding
them or aiming for a climate-neutral city (e.g. Nijmegen).
Some provinces, such as Gelderland, are actively monitor-
ing and encouraging and even subsidizing local projects,
but this depends on the province (personal communica-
tions Gelderland Province, 2013). There are many munici-
pal subsidies for, e.g. home insulation and joint purchase
of solar panels [47].
Next to government actors, the market parties have a
large role in the arrangement, and they are mostly fossil
fuel-oriented. The Gasunie has a strong lobby, as do Royal
Dutch Shell and Exxon. Large fossil fuel-based companies
that operate in the Netherlands are sometimes indicated
as the ‘coal lobby’ and include Eon, Nuon/Vattenfall,
Essent/RWE and Electrabel/GDF Suez. The fossil fuel in-
dustry has invested over 5 billion euros in the past years
in three new coal-fired power plants in Slochteren and De
Tweede Maasvlakte, which means they have a large inter-
est in low coal prices and the absence of strict emissions
trading [48]. Historically, the Netherlands also has large
interests in the domestic gas industry, with gas revenues
of 14 billion euros in 2012 [49], and in the fossil fuel
dependent heavy industry. The Dutch government stated
in 2008 that it facilitates the energy industry and that mar-
ket parties, through investing in production facilities and
(international) trade, determine the energy mix (ibid.).
Not only the companies that have electricity or gas as
their products lobby for fossil fuels. Sectors such as agri-
culture and transport are heavily subsidized for their use
of fossil fuels and hence form a strong lobby as well. The
tax schemes for kerosene and agricultural diesel and the
energy tax reduction for bulk consumers of energy are
only a few examples of the 50+ energy interventions of
the Dutch government that favour fossil fuels [50]. In
comparison to the vested interests of the fossil fuel
(dependent) industry, the influence of market parties that
lobby for RE is very little. RE suppliers in the Netherlands
mostly have a mixed portfolio with both RE and fossil
fuel-based energy and import most of their RE through
certificate trading (personal communications Eneco, 2011).
There is no large industry for building RE facilities (such
as the solar panel industry in Germany or turbine manu-
facturing in Denmark) and although a few NGOs for RE
exist, mostly in the shape of umbrella organizations for
local RE initiatives, they have relatively little political influ-
ence or financial means (personal communications HIER
Opgewekt, 2013).
The ‘rules of the game’ in the Netherlands have been al-
tered since the 2010 parliamentary elections, when new
policy goals and means were introduced and energy policy
was allocated to the department of Economic Affairs. Prior
to the elections, there was an extensive interdepartmental
cooperation, and energy policy was linked to climate
change and environmental issues [45]. However, recent
policies have again become more economic-oriented, fo-
cusing on ‘high potential’ projects through the Green Deal
subsidy system that rewards projects that are economically
viable. The SDE + subsidy scheme for solar panels on pri-
vate households was capped. The primacy of the depart-
ment of Economic Affairs means that policies are more
aimed at achieving energy security and the international
competitive position of the Netherlands (personal com-
munications PBL, 2013).
There are relatively little investments in nuclear power.
At present, there is one active nuclear power plant
(Borssele) and there were plans for a ‘Borssele 2’, but these
plans were abandoned by prime investor Delta Energy in
2012. As stated by the investor, this decision was based on
NIMBY protest, overcapacity of the Dutch grid following
the economic crisis and fossil fuel-based plants in Gro-
ningen province, the negative image of nuclear power after
Fukushima and uncertainty about Dutch policies on
CO2 emissions trading [51]. With the nuclear alterna-
tive abandoned, the Dutch government turned to large
wind projects (both offshore and onshore) to reach its
sustainability targets, which were reduced from 20% to
14% RE by 2020. The government takes a centralized,
economic approach towards large-scale wind farms, but
planning is partly left to the provinces that have each
been given a minimum target for installed wind capacity
(but without real sanctions). Each province takes its
own approach, e.g. Limburg has a minimum of three
turbines per site, whereas Noord-Holland stopped all
wind park developments.
Overall, the RE subsystem in the Netherlands can be
categorized as a vested interests and business-oriented
policy arrangement. Market parties are dominant in
terms of steering the energy mix and taking initiative for
new energy facilities, although the government does set
minimum requirements for RE production and con-
sumption and the upcoming Energy Agreement prom-
ises a more active and steering role for the government
for RE production. At the moment, however, policies are
framed in terms of cost-benefit analyses, risk avoidance
rather than innovation and the (international) economic
position of the country in energy supply and trade. Sus-
tainability or climate change are no big issues and hardly
part of the dominant policy discourses. There is an in-
crease of domestic RE production, through household
efforts, business investments and large wind parks. The
role of local communities has long been limited to strong
local NIMBY responses. With the exception of the prepa-
rations for a new Energy Agreement in which the govern-
ment will set out its new strategy to comply with the
European 2020 targets, renewable energy does not seem
to be very high on the political or public agenda.
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Community initiatives in the Netherlands can thus be
characterized as a very young phenomenon, which is rap-
idly developing but has a small influence and receives little
attention from the dominant government and market
players. Community initiatives are limitedly institutionally
supported through rules, subsidies or active governmental
support.
Community initiatives in Germany
Germany knows a large variety of community initiatives
for RE, mostly set up as cooperatives (Energiegenos-
senschaften) [41,52]. The tradition of energy cooperatives
dates back to the early twentieth century when decentral
cooperatives (based on fossil fuels) were set up to assure
electricity provision in remote areas [44,53]. Since then,
the Energiegenossenschaften have been present in the
German energy system, as has a network of municipal
Stadtwerke: local utility companies that provide heat and
electricity. These were originally owned by municipalities
but are now often (partly) privatized or owned through
local cooperatives. Since 2009, their number has risen
drastically and they have become increasingly interested
in local ‘green’ solutions for energy [34]. There are now
over 650 Stadtwerke, which mostly have their own pro-
duction facilities or are in the process of construction
[44]. This covers a wide variety of projects including PV
systems on public roofs, biomass-based heating and ma-
nure fermenting. They provide an example of citizen in-
volvement and collaboration between citizens and local
governments.
The largest group of cooperatives is formed by solar
cooperatives, in strong contrast to the Netherlands and
Denmark where these are virtually absent. Solar cooper-
atives are a relatively new phenomenon in Germany, and
their number has risen greatly in the past years: from
only 4 in 2007 to over 200 by 2010 [54]. Wind coopera-
tives (Bürgerwindparks) form a smaller group but with a
longer history and larger installed capacity. They were
founded from the early 1990s onwards, enabled by the
1991 feed-in legislation [55]. There are now 45 wind co-
operatives operational or under development [56], but
wind parks also adopt other ownership models than the
traditional cooperative [36]. It is estimated that over 50%
of Germany's installed capacity of onshore wind was
owned by private citizens and local initiatives in 2010
[41,57]. This is the same if other RE sources are in-
cluded: about half of the RE production facilities are lo-
cally owned by private households and cooperatives
(40%) and farmers (10%) [58,59]. This will however de-
crease if large commercial offshore wind projects are de-
veloped, as investments in that area have been negligible
in the past years [41]. The produced electricity is sold to
the grid, although there are increasing investments in
private storage [51].
There is a large variety of RE sources and participation
models used among community initiatives in Germany
[34,36], but the PV cooperatives and Bürgerwindparks
are the most successful and prominent [41]. The other
initiatives know a large variety, including biomass heat-
ing, combined and heat power (CHP) projects, and ini-
tiatives in early planning phase. We find projects in both
rural and urban areas but with an increased attention
for sustainability in cities.
The German institutional arrangement
The Germans are known for their ‘Energiewende’, the
transition from a fossil fuel and nuclear power-oriented
energy sector towards a more sustainable system with a
large RE component. The Energiewende was initiated in
the early 1980s because of growing environmental and
climate concerns, and the 1989 Chernobyl disaster acted
as a catalyst. Hence, the policies show a strong coupling
between energy, climate change and environmental pro-
tection as well as anti-nuclear sentiments and safety
concerns. The term Energiewende not only signifies the
shift from fossil to RE but also a reorientation in policy
making. The attention shifted from supply to demand
(demand side management) and the planning process of
RE production became more decentralized and more
democratic (although overall targets have been decided
top-down and the state adopted a dominant steering
role). The traditional power division in which a few large
energy companies dominated the market was altered
through governmental steering and decentrally owned
and exploited Stadtwerke and other RE facilities. Current
German RE targets include 35% of RE production by
2020 and large cuts in consumption. In the first half of
2012, Germany produced a record high 26% of its energy
production from renewable sources. The RE component
in the energy mix consists mainly of wind (9.2%), bio-
mass (5.7%) and solar power (5.2%) [60].
The actors in the energy production subsystem consist
of multiple government levels, large market parties and
an abundance of small, locally owned RE facilities. The
‘big four’ market parties that own over 80% of fossil
fuel and nuclear-based energy production facilities in
Germany are Eon, EnBW, RWE and Vattenfall [59]. As
large industrial players, they lead a strong lobby for fossil
fuels and nuclear power. Their share (and thus interest)
in RE production facilities is very limited: only 6.5% of
the RE facilities exploited in Germany is owned by the
‘big four’, whereas, as mentioned earlier, 40% is owned
by private households or cooperatives and another 10%
by farmers (ibid.) [36]. This strengthens the public opin-
ion that favors RE over fossil fuels because RE projects
create revenue for villages or private owners and because
of the growing safety concerns about nuclear power ex-
ploitation. The nuclear lobby has traditionally had a lot
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of power in Germany. In 2010, a national long-term
strategy for the Energiewende was designed, in which nu-
clear power was seen as a ‘transition tool’: a choice that
has been attributed to the influence of the nuclear power
lobby. However, this was abandoned after the 2011
Fukushima disaster and subsequent strong anti-nuclear
protests throughout Germany [61]. Public opinion proved
stronger than the nuclear lobby, and Chancellor Merkel
designed a new RE policy scheme in which nuclear power
will be phased out to be abandoned completely by 2022.
This will be replaced by electricity from renewable
sources, natural gas turbines, a decrease in consumption
and demand side management [42].
In order to achieve these ambitious policy goals, a
number of rules, stimulating and regulating policy mea-
sures, were put in place [37]. The Renewable Energy
Act guarantees feed-in tariffs (FIT) with set rates for 20
years, to ensure profitability of each RE technology. It
also regulates priority grid access for electricity from
renewable sources. Moreover, the German state-owned
bank KfW has 100 billion euros in credit loans available
in 2012 to 2017, for RE production plans and energy-
saving projects such as building insulation. Financial
support for RE is not new to German policy makers: in
the late 1980s, three German towns introduced a full-
cost compensation for solar PV utilities, which can be
seen as the first decentralized prototype for FIT [42].
In addition, Germany has an environmental taxation
scheme for environmentally unfriendly activities, such
as use of fossil fuels. Subsidies for RE include a subsidy
scheme for renewable heating in building renovations
through the Renewable Heat Act and numerous state
subsidies for private household energy savings and local
production.
The decision to phase out nuclear power caused a sud-
den policy change, when 8 out of the 17 operating nu-
clear plants were shut down after the 2011 Fukushima
disaster. Although the previous Schröder government
had already designed the phase out, Chancellor Merkel
had delayed these plans by 12 years and now changed
her opinion on nuclear power. Though this was criti-
cized for being a political move [62], close before three
state elections, it meant that the Energiewende had to be
accelerated, which poses practical problems for, e.g. con-
struction of new sites and infrastructure. The main
means for large-scale RE production is offshore wind in
the north of the country, whereas the large industrial
areas, i.e. the demand for electricity, are primarily in the
south. Moreover, the original Energiewende designs in-
cluded a large role for R&D and new technology devel-
opment, which cannot easily be accelerated. The ‘big
four’ predicted blackouts following this sudden capacity
reduction, but this did not actually happen and security
of supply thus was ensured.
The German RE policy subsystem is moderately decen-
tralized. Although the federal level sets policy targets and
goals, the states decide about the implementation of these
projects, e.g. through the allocation of wind zoning plans
and subsidy schemes [35]. This is often delegated to
municipalities.
The discourse in the government policy is an integra-
tion of multiple motivations. The main motivations are
industrial opportunities, security of supply and the re-
duction of greenhouse gas emissions (personal commu-
nications PBL, 2013). This means that policies that
demand short-term investments, but are profitable on
the long-term, are still considered (ibid.). Moreover, Ger-
man energy policy is based on ethical issues regarding
the environment and anti-nuclear considerations, and
this is more heavily weighted in decision making than in
other European countries (ibid.). In contrast to the
Dutch discourse, energy policy is part of a lively and
open public debate, including, e.g. the demonstrations of
210,000 people for closure of all nuclear power plants
following Fukushima [63]. The subsequent historic win
of the Green Party in the Baden Württemberg state elec-
tions and the phase-out of nuclear power are attributed
to a pro-renewables and anti-nuclear public opinion
[42,64]. Both policy decisions and outcomes and the
relative weight attached to environmental and safety
concerns strengthen the ecological and ethical basis of
the discourse as reflected in the policies.
In conclusion, we can see that the German govern-
ment highly prioritizes the energy transition and that it
sees an active role for decentralized projects of all kinds,
including different RE sources and ownership models,
which increases public acceptance [38].
Community initiatives in Denmark
The idea of a community initiative carries a somewhat
different meaning in Denmark: where in the Netherlands,
these initiatives often have difficulties finding a mode of
cooperation with the local government, in Denmark the
local government works closely together with local com-
panies and (groups of) citizens. The system is very decen-
tralized, which means that municipalities (Kommuner)
have to realize the ambitious national goals on a local
level, without much guidance or budget (personal com-
munications Region Nordjyllland, 2013). Communities
thus have a lot of opportunities to design their own pro-
jects, and the local government is likely to support them.
Moreover, provision for RE is seen as a means for revital-
izing the community, generating revenue, and ensuring
energy security and independence.
Community initiatives in Denmark can be divided into
three different types. First, there are numerous community
district heating (CDH) systems that operate local heat net-
works, often combined with electricity production (CHP).
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They are owned either by Kommuner or cooperatives
(personal communications CDH Aalborg, 2013). Trad-
itionally, the CDH plants were fuelled not only by mostly
natural gas but also by waste incineration. Frederiksberg
was for example the first CHP waste incineration plant,
established in 1903 [65]. Today, there are hundreds of
CDH plants, both in rural areas (e.g. the famous Samsø
island) and in cities. There are, e.g. 20 systems for
Copenhagen alone (ibid.), which proves that in both rural
and urban regions, these projects are feasible. Only in re-
cent years, following national RE targets, have CDH sys-
tems become more ‘green’ through using solar panels and
biomass combustion. They are now fuelled by a variety of
renewable resources including wood chips and biogas, and
residual heat from local industrial sites is used. Natural
gas is still present, but mostly as a backup (personal com-
munications CDH Aalborg, 2013).
A second type of initiative, and one that Denmark is
renowned for, is wind cooperatives. The 1970s oil crisis
caused a massive rise of wind cooperatives, and estima-
tions of the total number of locally owned turbines ran
up to over 2,000 in total in the late 1990s [66]. These
projects were typically small, rural and owned by farmers,
private households or local companies or investors. How-
ever, following the liberalization of the energy market and
the high local RE targets, many of the turbines were sold
off to large investors who could replace them with bigger
and more expensive turbines [67]. In 2008, a survey re-
vealed around 100 active wind cooperatives [68], and
three-quarters of the onshore turbines are still locally
owned [69]. Recently, some high-profile projects have
emerged, such as the renewable island Samsø and Hvide
Sande Havn windfarm cooperative (personal communica-
tions Samsø development research Copenhagen University,
2013) [70]. However, these contradict the general trend in
wind turbine ownership, which moves away from local pro-
jects and towards large project developers and investors
(personal communications Dong Energy, 2013; personal
communications Wind People Denmark, 2013). The sub-
sidy that has been available for an environmental impact
assessment for new projects was only applied for 12 times
in the past few years, indicating that the number of aspir-
ing new projects is negligible (ibid.).
A third group of projects is a more diverse category of
small manure fermentation projects, solar panels for
apartment buildings and projects in experimental stages,
such as wave power projects (personal communications
Danish Wave Energy Centre, 2013). Denmark has always
been a frontrunner in developing and testing new tech-
nologies at the local level, but budget cuts have limited
this since severe subsidy cuts in 2002 (personal commu-
nications Nordic Folkecenter for Renewable Energy,
2013). Leading up to the 2009 UN Climate Change Con-
ference in Copenhagen, many local informal initiatives
were started to, e.g. discuss reduction of consumption
and sustainability in the local community in general.
However, after the conference had ended, the interest in
this topic lessened, and most of these groups dissolved
(personal communications Wind People Denmark, 2013).
The unique feature of these groups was that their motiv-
ation was mostly environmental: the wind cooperatives
and other RE initiatives have a primarily economic mo-
tivation (personal communications Region Midtjylland,
2013; personal communications Energibyen Frederik-
shavn, 2013). The Kommuner support this, both to im-
prove the local economy and to reach the national
targets for RE.
Out of the 98 Kommuner in Denmark, 18 have a complete
climate change policy, including measures for mitigation
and adaptation to climate chang, and a plan for decentra-
lized RE provision. Other Kommuner are in the process of
developing this [71]. Most employ energy advisors, which
provide local companies and households with free advice
on energy savings and production. Although these initia-
tives are partly initiated by the Kommune government, the
community plays a large role and community partners are
equal to the government in terms of decision-making,
planning and implementation of the activities.
The Danish institutional arrangement
Of the three countries, Denmark is the most decentra-
lized. Municipal governments (Kommuner) have both fi-
nancial means and large independence for policy design,
including on RE. There is however a strong national
framework in which the policies have to be embedded,
and it is ambitious: Denmark strives to have 100% of its
energy supply covered by RE by 2050. The 2012 Energy
Agreement provides an extensive framework of energy
saving and RE production measures. The motivation for
the agreement is the protection of the climate. RE pro-
duction is planned mostly through offshore wind and
(co-)combustion of biomass, although Denmark also in-
vests considerably in R&D for wave power.
The main actor at the central government level is the
Ministry of Climate and Energy, the name already dem-
onstrating an environmental take on the energy prob-
lem. The main partner of the Minister of Energy is the
Ministry of Finance, which poses severe constraints on
the RE ambitions of Denmark, as the Climate and Energy
ministry does not have the funds to match its ambitious
targets (personal communications Ministry of Climate
and Energy, 2103; personal communications Dong Energy,
2013). The Ministry also works together with the Danish
Energy Agency (DEA), an interest organization for energy
producers. There is a strong lobby in the energy sector,
but it focuses on favourable business models and not
necessarily on fossil fuels (ibid.; personal communica-
tions GreenGo Energy, 2013). The main market parties
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in Denmark, holding the majority of the production fa-
cilities, are Dong Energy and Vattenfall. Dong Energy
is strongly in favour of RE, as it owns large offshore
wind parks. Its lobby is therefore focused at increase of
the FIT (ibid.). Since Dong Energy is the most influen-
tial member of the DEA, this organization lobbies with
the same goals. Another main actor is Maersk, which
has large interests in fossil fuels. It has been quiet in
the public debate on energy but defends its interests
with the national government (ibid.). All in all, the fos-
sil fuel lobby is not as prominent as in the Netherlands
and Germany. Moreover, Denmark has no nuclear
power facilities, and a 1985 law prohibits the produc-
tion of any nuclear power. Following the 1970s oil cri-
sis, self-sufficiency became the primary goal that was
attained in 1997 [72]. A last group of actors that is in-
fluential in Denmark are turbine manufacturers, in-
cluding Vestas, Siemens Windpower and a number of
smaller manufacturers. These are important for re-
gional employment and form a motive for regional and
local projects to invest in wind power (personal com-
munications Region Midtjylland, 2013).
Another token of decentralization is the Danish plan-
ning system. Following the 1997 revision of the number,
size and responsibilities of the provinces (Regioner), the re-
sponsibility for spatial planning of wind parks was shifted
from the Region to the municipality. This caused a huge
loss of expertise and weakened the position of the Regi-
oner. All have ambitious RE policies, but ‘all we have left is
the power to motivate, and that is not enough’ (personal
communications Region Nordjylland, 2013). The Kommu-
ner are now primarily responsible for RE planning and
attaining the national goals, but they have to do so on a
limited budget and limited capacity (ibid.; personal com-
munications Kommune Frederikshavn, 2013).
In terms of rules, there have been some shifts over the
years, especially in FIT policies. In the 1980s, the wind
policies were very supportive of local cooperatives, ensur-
ing minimum prices through FITs, and 40% investment
subsidies for construction [72]. These policy measures
were aimed at local communities, and the decentralized
community-based approach was successful: by 1990, there
were over 2,000 local cooperatives and private owners
exploiting turbines (ibid.). ‘wind turbines had obtained a
right to sell their electricity to large power companies at
fixed prices, but apart from that, the Danish electricity
sector was in reality a monopoly’ (ibid.). The liberalization
of the energy market that was enforced by the European
Union replaced this monopoly with a market-oriented sys-
tem in the early 2000s. The FIT scheme was replaced by
RE portfolio standards and an emissions trading scheme
in an attempt to control the costs of the support for RE.
Because of the limited competitiveness of wind turbines, a
premium was introduced in 2003, but a market approach
remained dominant. In 2007, the government set the
100% by 2050 target, and shortly after that, the market-
based support system was transformed back to an FIT sys-
tem with a clearer steering role for the state, as the market
approach was found insufficient to reach such ambitious
goals. FIT was reintroduced in 2009, with differentiated
rates per RE source. Supplementing this, the 2012 Energy
Agreement includes 62 actions for the government, ran-
ging from feasibility analyses for certain types of projects
to a new ‘security of supply’ tax on energy. The agreement
does not only include RE production but also energy sav-
ings, heat systems and transport. For heating, the subsidy
scheme for RE heating is abolished and replaced by a ban
on all use of oil and natural gas in new buildings. RE
sources for heating are still exempt from tax obligations.
Solar panels were supported through a net taxation model,
but this has been abandoned in 2012 as it became too
costly. Moreover, a ‘security of supply tax’ was introduced
on all energy, including RE, ‘of course, this tax has nothing
to do with security of supply. It is a way of including re-
newable sources in the taxation too’ (personal commu-
nications Dong Energy, 2013). These late subsidy cuts
and new tax schemes have made the national govern-
ment an unreliable partner for local initiatives, and in-
vestments in RE, especially on solar panels, have almost
come to a standstill (personal communications Wind
People Denmark, 2013).
As the only country in this comparison, Denmark has
a section in its energy law aimed specifically at communi-
ties. This law ensures a fund for local community develop-
ment as a financial compensation for onshore wind
turbine and determines that in a commercial build of new
onshore turbines, 20% of shares should be offered to the
local population to give them a chance to benefit finan-
cially from the revenue of the turbine [29]. These laws
were put into place because after local ownership of tur-
bines declined, there was a huge NIMBY response to
new projects (personal communications Wind People
Denmark, 2013; personal communications Samsø devel-
opment research Copenhagen University, 2013). This was
especially prominent in cities and other more densely
populated areas, where NIMBY protests are more easily
organized and more people are affected by visual or sound
disturbances (ibid.).
Finally, an analysis of the discourse reveals a mix of eco-
nomic and environmental motivations. Where the original
aims are environmental protection, climate change mitiga-
tion and energy security, the policy measures are designed
to stimulate competitiveness of RE and economic motiva-
tions can especially be seen at the local level (e.g. personal
communications Region Midtjylland, 2013). Energy secur-
ity, independence from (imported) fossil fuels and nuclear
power and economic long-term profitability motivate pol-
icy plans. The public debate is focused on ‘green’ issues on
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the national level, but for decentralized projects, there is a
mixed response. Partly, community-based projects are
framed as a means of community revitalization (see
below). Demographic decline and a lack of social cohesion
can be changed through community projects for RE: RE is
not seen as an end in itself, but as a means to a social end
(e.g. personal communications Samsø development re-
search Copenhagen University, 2013). However, where
there is no revenue for the local community, NIMBY re-
sponses have increased. Ownership seems to play an im-
portant role in local acceptance, but either way, the local
discourse is not as strongly environmentally oriented as
the national policy discourse. Nevertheless, local commu-
nities are still investing in ‘becoming green’, through vari-
ous means including turbine exploitation, local heat
planning and privately owned solar power. The famous
example of the island of Samsø shows that innovation at
the local level leads to new ownership structures (a mix of
cooperatively owned turbines and turbines owned by
farmers) and to new opportunities for local revenue. This
development takes place in cities and rural areas alike, but
city-based projects tend to be more top-down and focused
on convincing citizens to participate, where in rural areas,
they tend to play more (personal communications Project
Zero Sønderborg, 2013).
Conclusions
Community initiatives emerge across different (Western
European) institutional contexts, but the characteristics
of the institutional system influence their development,
abundance and success. Next to differences in financial
incentives, the relative positions of the state, market par-
ties and communities and their goals and priorities are
among the key factors that explain the rise and continu-
ity of community initiatives. Below, we summarize our
findings on how the institutional arrangements enable or
constrain community initiatives, following the dimen-
sions of the PAA.
Institutional space for community initiatives
Across the three countries, there are noticeable differences
in the dominant policy discourse. In the Netherlands, this
is a strongly economic rationale, which creates a misfit
with the rising number of community initiatives that are
mostly operating on the basis of environmental concerns.
In Germany, the policy discourse is predominantly envir-
onmental, and the local communities act on this same ra-
tionale. This discursive coherence creates institutional
support for communities. In Denmark, we see that the na-
tional government currently has a mixed environmental,
social and economic discourse and that these (but primar-
ily the economic) are recurring across government levels
as well as within the local initiatives, which increases
the cooperation between government and initiatives.
This demonstrates the importance of the dimension of
policy discourses, not only that it reflects environmen-
tal, economic or mixed rationales but also that national
discourses can align with discourses of decentralized
policy levels and of local communities. This alignment
creates institutional (discursive) space for community
initiatives. In terms of actors and resources, we see that
the market parties pro-fossil fuels and pro-nuclear
power have a strong presence in the Netherlands and
Germany but are less dominant or even absent in
Denmark. On the contrary, over the years, Denmark de-
veloped a strong role of large market parties for RE sup-
ply and turbine manufacturing. The government is most
dominant in the German system and least in the Dutch,
which demonstrates that some governmental steering,
especially through financial incentives, is critical for
community initiatives. In Denmark, decentralization is
an important feature of institutional arrangement; the
Kommuner acquire relatively not only more power but
also large responsibilities. There are quite some differ-
ences between these Kommuner in their ambition, goals
and activities for renewable energy, but most are ambi-
tious and set up a large range of local projects. The re-
sources for community initiatives are best accessible in
Denmark, where FITs are guaranteed and subsidies for
planning are available. Germany also has FITs and a num-
ber of local and regional subsidies. In the Netherlands, the
subsidy scheme is the least elaborate and consistent. We
see that the most enabling environment for community
initiatives is an arrangement in which policies on the re-
source division are consistent and where powerful actors,
whether governmental or market parties, have a stake in
renewable energy.
Classification into the governance ideal types provided
insight in the position of communities within the subsys-
tem. Table 2 shows the key characteristics of each system
in terms of the PAA, and which ideal-typical institutional
arrangement this resembles most.
We hypothesized that the Netherlands would have a
market-oriented arrangement, that Germany would be
strongly state-oriented and that in Denmark, communities
would have a more dominant position. For the Danish
case, this hypothesis has been falsified. Over the last
decade, the economic rationale (including the econom-
ics of scale) has gained influence and has decreased the
power of the communities in favour of state-initiated
projects with large market parties. In the Netherlands
and Denmark, the ideal types can indeed be recognized.
The Netherlands can be categorized as a mostly eco-
nomic or market-oriented policy arrangement. Policies
are very often framed in terms of cost-benefit analyses,
emphasizing risk avoidance rather than innovation and
focusing on the (international) economic position of the
country in energy supply and trade. German energy
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policy is much more state-based and proactive and, besides
the emphasis (and possibility) of long-term industrial polit-
ics, is also more based on ethical issues regarding the envir-
onment, climate change and anti-nuclear considerations.
This is not to say that the Danes have abandoned their
decentralized sustainability politics. The Danish state
shows continuous ambition in RE policies, leading to the
100%-by-2050 target, and an ever more unambiguous
steering role for the state as the market approach was
deemed ‘insufficient’ to reach ambitious goals on its own.
The Danish system is, though decentralized and having a
strong role for the local authorities (Kommunerrer), also a
state-oriented institutional system, with intensive cooper-
ation between societal initiatives and governmental actors.
The Danish state used to create much room for commu-
nity initiatives, and one of the spin offs of its pro-RE policy
is the establishment of strong RE market parties, which in-
crease their prominence in the policy arrangement.
Community initiatives
The position, shape and approach of community initiatives
vary considerably across the countries. A number of differ-
ences that stand out are listed below.
In Table 3, we see different dynamics between the
countries, which can be explained by the differences in
the institutional systems of each country. However, the
trend across the systems is that community initiatives
are rising and becoming more powerful. Even though
the ownership model in Denmark is changing for wind
turbines, community initiatives are not disappearing
from the scene. Community initiatives are gaining in-
fluence in Germany and the Netherlands, and whether
the shift to RE is approached from an economic or an
environmental perspective, and taken slow or fast,
communities seem to be a key ingredient in the new
RE mix. In the ‘Methods’ section, it was stressed that
the ideal type of a community-oriented arrangement
does not stand on its own (though ideal types never
do) but needs to be supported by the state and market.
In none of the case study countries, the community
orientation is dominant, but in Germany and Denmark, a
combination seems to be possible of both of top-down
implementation of ambitious environmental targets and
local facilitation and innovation, thus creating more insti-
tutional space for community initiatives. This increases
the fertile ground for communities to (co-)develop pro-
jects and thus steers the energy sector towards a more
heterogeneous mix of initiatives at the local level.
The policy arrangements in the three countries vary
considerably, which can be reconstructed by looking at
Table 2 Policy arrangement of the RE policy subsystem
The Netherlands Germany Denmark
Actors Department of Economic Affairs, large
(fossil fuel) market parties have strong
influence, little decentralization
Ministry of Economy and Technology, involvement
of Chancellor, large (nuclear/fossil fuel) market
parties have moderate influence, public opinion
strongly pro-RE, moderate decentralization
Department of Energy and Climate,
large (pro-RE) market parties have little
influence, large decentralization
Rules Goal of 14% by 2020, no FIT but
various subsidies, rules mostly
regulatory
Goal of 35% by 2020 and phase out of nuclear
power plants
Goal of 100% by 2050, rules both
constraining and enabling, FITs
present
Rules mostly enabling, FITs present
Resources Moderate government spending Large spending on goals Energiewende Large spending on long-term goals
Discourse Economical (short term), energy
security, competitive position,
profitability of RE
Economical (long-term) Mixed environmental and economical
Ideal type
arrangement
Market oriented State oriented State oriented
Table 3 Differences community initiatives movements across countries
The Netherlands Germany Denmark
Phase of
development of
initiatives
Early phase of development, minority
well-established and fully operational
Well-established and
operational, searching new
modes
Well-established and operational
Size and growth of
number of initiatives
Moderate group, growing rapidly Moderate group, growing Large group, decline traditional cooperatives,
growth new local initiatives
Focus activity RE provision, support for private savings/
production
Collective production, energy
savings
Collective production, creating revenue
Momentum Little public debate on energy but relatively
large attention for community initiatives
Large public debate on
nuclear power and green
economy
Large public consensus over ‘green’ goals and
economic possibilities RE, increasing NIMBY
response
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the conditions external to the policy subsystem and a
series of policy responses to these conditions. Examples
are the economic crisis that forced Denmark to focus on
renewable energy but also on the economic most viable
options (large scale investments), the biophysical condi-
tions in the Netherlands that explain a focus on fossil
fuels and the anti-nuclear sentiments in combination
with the shock of the 2011 Fukushima disaster that sped
up the phasing out of nuclear power in Germany. This
interplay between external conditions, policy and polit-
ical decisions and dynamics between the actors in the
policy subsystem are indirectly - by way of changing ar-
rangements - determining the institutional space for
communities.
Our findings suggest that, for the institutional space for
community initiatives, the precise content of the dominant
discourse seems less determining than the alignment of a
dominant discourse across government levels and actors.
If the community has a rationale similar to the govern-
ment, this creates opportunities for community initiatives.
Moreover, the division of resources and the rules of the
game determine the availability of funding, permits, etc.,
but their precise content seems less important than their
stability and predictability and how they are in line with
the needs of the communities.
However, these conclusions do not imply that struc-
tural characteristics are more important for success than
agency or biophysical characteristics. Although inter-
national variation can be explained through different na-
tional institutional arrangements, all interviews pointed
out that for individual projects, agency characteristics
such as leadership skills, pro-environmental attitudes
and management skills play a vital role. Moreover, the
possibilities and planning processes for projects depend
on the (bio)physical conditions, such as the degree of
urbanization. In the past, most projects were realized in
rural regions, but the increasing variety of projects has
led to more project designs appropriate for built envi-
ronments, and projects became more equally distributed
between cities and rural areas. Although this is the case
for small projects, national governments still tend to
focus on large rural and offshore projects.
This research has sketched three national arrange-
ments and the position of the community movement
therein. This broad scope gives an overview of national
dynamics and trends, but more detailed studies of cases
of sustainable regions, cities and initiatives could provide
more insight in the dynamics between the involved ac-
tors and policies. This could strengthen and nuance the
analysis of this article. Moreover, there remains a need
for a comprehensive overview of community initiatives.
The lack of reliable data on the number and activities of
community initiatives poses a constraint for this analysis,
and further research will increase the validity of the
findings and provide more insight into a category of actors
that is diverse, rapidly growing and increasingly important
for RE provision.
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